The next climate frontier

For many Pakistanis, the annual climate negotiations held under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) often appear distant from everyday realities.

Discussions on adaptation indicators, technical roadmaps, transparency frameworks or climate finance architecture can seem disconnected from the immediate concerns of heatwaves in Punjab, floods in Sindh, droughts in Balochistan, glacier melt in Gilgit-Baltistan, or growing water insecurity across the Indus Basin.

Yet the outcomes of the 64th Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) by UNFCCC, held in Bonn, Germany (June 8-18) may prove more consequential for countries like Pakistan than many headline-grabbing climate summits. Unlike the Conference of the Parties (COP), where political declarations often dominate, the Bonn sessions are where the architecture of climate governance is built.

The SB64 was not a meeting that produced dramatic announcements or large financial pledges. Instead, it signalled something far more significant: the global climate regime is entering an era where implementation, accountability and measurement are becoming the new battlegrounds of climate diplomacy.

For over a decade, climate negotiations focused primarily on establishing goals. Countries negotiated temperature targets, adaptation frameworks, loss and damage mechanisms and climate finance commitments.

Those foundational debates largely culminated in the Paris Agreement, the Global Stocktake and the adoption of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. At SB64, negotiators shifted their attention from what should be achieved to how progress will be measured, monitored, reviewed and reported.

The most visible example was the advancement of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Negotiators agreed to establish a Technical Task Force to develop methodologies and improve the metadata behind the newly adopted Belém Adaptation Indicators.

While this may appear highly technical, the implications are profound because adaptation has historically suffered from a measurement problem. Unlike mitigation, where emissions reductions can be quantified relatively easily, adaptation outcomes are often difficult to measure. The new indicators will eventually influence how adaptation progress is assessed globally and, more importantly, how adaptation finance is allocated.

This development should be of particular interest to Pakistan. The country has consistently argued that it is among the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations. However, vulnerability alone is no longer sufficient in climate negotiations.

As the global climate governance system becomes increasingly data-driven, countries will need strong evidence, indicators and reporting systems to demonstrate adaptation needs, resilience gaps and financing requirements. In many ways, the future climate diplomacy landscape will increasingly reward those countries that can produce credible data and translate vulnerability into measurable outcomes.

SB64 also demonstrated the growing importance of oceans, food systems, climate science and nature-based solutions within the climate agenda. The Oceans and Climate Change Dialogue gained prominence as countries explored the role of marine ecosystems, coastal resilience and blue economy investments in climate action.

Research and Systematic Observation discussions highlighted the importance of climate science, early warning systems and observation networks. Agriculture and food security discussions continued to focus on resilience, smallholder farmers and climate impacts across food systems.

For Pakistan, these developments present both opportunities and challenges. Historically, Pakistan’s climate diplomacy has been heavily shaped by floods, glaciers and loss-and-damage narratives.

While these issues remain critical, the evolving climate agenda requires a broader strategic approach. Pakistan must strengthen its engagement on water governance, food security, drought resilience, heat adaptation, climate-health linkages, urban resilience and climate security.

Perhaps the most important political message from Bonn was that the trust deficit between developed and developing countries remains unresolved.

Across discussions on adaptation, just transition, finance, and implementation, developing countries repeatedly raised concerns about the inadequacy of climate finance and the growing tendency of developed countries to prioritise reporting frameworks, methodologies and private finance solutions over direct public financial support.

This tension is unlikely to disappear before COP31. In fact, it may intensify. While developed countries increasingly frame climate action through financial system reforms, investment mobilisation, and private-sector engagement, developing countries continue to emphasise obligations related to public finance, technology transfer and capacity building. The fundamental question remains unchanged: who will pay for the transition and adaptation costs faced by vulnerable nations?

For Pakistan, this debate is particularly relevant. The country faces an estimated climate financing requirement of $348 billion by 2030 while simultaneously struggling with debt pressures, fiscal constraints, water stress, food insecurity and growing climate-induced economic losses.

Climate finance is therefore not merely an environmental issue but has increasingly become a development, economic and national security issue.

Looking ahead to COP31, several themes are likely to dominate negotiations. The adaptation finance will remain a central point of contention, particularly as countries seek to operationalise the Global Goal on Adaptation.

The review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and the refinement of Belém Adaptation Indicators will shape future discussions on adaptation accountability. The Just Transition negotiations are expected to intensify as developing countries push for stronger commitments on finance, technology transfer and equitable economic transformation.

The finance required by the Global South to achieve a just transition is estimated to be $2.5 trillion per year, yet no mega grants have been offered as of now. The oceans, biodiversity, food systems and climate-resilient development pathways are also likely to gain greater prominence.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan must rethink its climate diplomacy strategy. Rather than approaching negotiations solely as a climate-vulnerable country seeking support, Pakistan should position itself as a bridge-builder capable of connecting multiple global crises.

The country must elevate climate diplomacy to the same strategic level as economic, trade and foreign policy engagement. Therefore, it needs a permanent ecosystem of negotiators, researchers, scientists and policy experts working year-round to support the country’s positions. Because the vulnerability must be translated into data, numbers, evidence and actionable proposals that can withstand technical scrutiny.

This creates an opportunity for what may be described as ‘multi-crisis diplomacy’. Pakistan’s climate diplomacy should increasingly connect climate negotiations with discussions on water governance, urban resilience, regional stability, food security, biodiversity conservation, debt sustainability and development finance. Such an approach would better reflect the realities faced by many countries in the Global South and allow Pakistan to exercise influence beyond traditional narratives of climate vulnerability.

Pakistan must also continue to strengthen its engagement within the G77 and China, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), and other developing-country coalitions.

At the same time, it should build issue-based alliances with Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and climate-vulnerable nations on adaptation, finance and resilience. Strategic partnerships around water, food systems, mountain ecosystems and climate security could further elevate Pakistan’s diplomatic profile.

Also, Pakistan cannot afford to wake up to climate diplomacy a few weeks before every COP. By then, many alliances, negotiating positions and political trade-offs have already been shaped. Effective climate diplomacy requires year-round engagement, coalition-building and technical preparation if Pakistan wants to help shape outcomes rather than simply respond to them.

Most importantly, for a country that consistently ranks among the most climate-vulnerable nations, Pakistan’s objective should not be visibility alone, but rather influence.

The measure of success at COP31 will not be the size of Pakistan’s pavilion but the extent to which Pakistan helps shape adaptation finance discussions, contributes to the evolution of the Global Goal on Adaptation, influences conversations around water security and climate resilience and builds coalitions capable of advancing the interests of vulnerable developing countries.

The Bonn negotiations revealed that the climate regime is entering a new phase. The era of negotiating frameworks is gradually giving way to an era of negotiating implementation. The countries that succeed in this environment will not necessarily be those that speak the loudest about vulnerability. They will be those who can translate vulnerability into evidence, coalitions, policy proposals, and diplomatic influence.

The real question on the road from Bonn to COP31 is whether Pakistan will be sitting at the tables where decisions are made, or whether it will continue sitting among those for whom decisions are being made.

The writer is an environmental scientist and leads the ecological sustainability and circular economy programme at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.

Originally published in The News