‘Stupid’ wars
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Smoke rises following an Israeli strike in Ayta al-Jabal, southern Lebanon, as seen from Tebnin Citadel, October 3, 2026. — Reuters

There are wars of necessity, and wars of choice. And according to Sir Lawrence Freedman, an acclaimed British scholar of military history, there are wars one can call “stupid”. He singles out the Iran war, where no serious thought was given to the political objectives of the war, the Iranian response, or the war’s global economic impact.

Some years back, Richard Haas, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, had described the Iraq war as a war of choice, and the Afghanistan war as a war of necessity. But the reality is these wars were also stupid. All three wars were the most recent additions to the long list of America-initiated wars since WWII that failed.

The reasons for America’s failure are complex, some of which have been detailed in Harman Ullman’s book ‘Anatomy of Failure: ‘Why America Loses Every War It Starts’. In fact, there is a great amount of scholarship available on the subject. America’s wars were incited by an overweening pride in its military power and prompted by domestic political interest groups, as explained in Jack Snyder’s excellent book ‘Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition’.

In my view, strategic aims and compulsions of electoral politics are hard to reconcile. And they result in half-hearted ‘imperialism’. Add to all this America’s ignorance or disrespect of other societies’ culture and history, and you have a perfect recipe for failure.

Given Americans’ own historical experience, going to war comes naturally to them. It is almost as if an American war is righteous by definition. In recent history, driven by a supreme consciousness of power and the hubris of the unipolar moment, and then scarred by 9/11, America simplified and distorted emerging global challenges and resorted to unilateralism. The result was failed wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Endless wars caused resentment abroad and grievances at home. The most recent consequences are before us in the form of massive losses by the Republicans in the midterms, largely due to the economic impact of the Iran war.

Israel had long wanted to use the pretext of Iran’s nuclear programme to attack and weaken it militarily, and, if possible, destabilise it. President Trump joined it to achieve the shared objective of denuclearising Iran and achieving a regime change. Beyond that, their aims diverged. Since the war failed, it is unclear what its real aims were, but Trump may have aspired to duplicate the Venezuelan experiment, conceivably eyeing its oil resources. Instead, Iran’s response cost America militarily, financially and diplomatically. Not to mention the political cost at home for the Republicans.

Internationally, Russia has made significant geopolitical and economic gains. China’s diplomatic profile has further risen, not just in the region but globally. And many middle powers are trying to fend for themselves by forming their own groupings. The Arab allies are wondering what to do next. And the future of US bases in the Middle East remains uncertain. As reported by the Guardian recently, a former State Department official, Mira Rapp-Hooper, has described the war as a “superpower suicide”.

President Trump had no plan, strategy or clearly thought-through war aims. He not only lacked knowledge about Iran but also had little understanding of the complexities of the contemporary world. Trump’s aura of power and personalised, whimsical and predatory conduct of foreign affairs is inherently risky, but when framed by America’s historical tendency to go to war as the first recourse of action, it is set up for failure. The country’s overwhelming military power and enormous economic strength give it such a wide margin for safety and latitude for error that it undermines careful deliberation on issues and policy choices. Hubris and ignorance are a bad combination. No wonder America treats military power as equal to victory.

The Iran war is actually quite old. It began with the Iraq war and would have proceeded to Iran had the Iraq war succeeded. But the failure of the Iraq project gave Iran a reprieve. There was no other explanation for the demobilisation of the armed forces and de-Ba’athification of Iraq planned by the neocons, except to weaken any challenge to Israel in the region. Instead, Iran ended up getting strategically stronger by gaining valuable Shia allies in Iraq.

The Iraq war was basically an opportunity to use the response to the 9/11 tragedy through the so-called war on terrorism under the vague and generalised rubric under which the US could launch military operations to achieve wider security and strategic objectives. The response was co-authored by cold warriors like Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice, and neocons with different but complementary objectives. The cold warriors wanted to expand America’s global footprint while China was still an emerging great power and Russia was an aspiring resurgent power. And the neocons were in there to help Israel. Democracy promotion, on which they both agreed, was nothing but a code word for change of regimes hostile to Israel and other American allies in the region.

Finally, take the case of Afghanistan. It was an unwinnable war the way it was conducted, especially given the realities of a broken and strife-torn country racked by multiple conflicts for decades. Above all, the 80s war and the subsequent civil war had changed not only Afghanistan but also the adjoining tribal areas in Pakistan, making the Afghan-Pakistan border areas almost like one country. And last but not least, not only the long-held elitist-led Pashtun-dominated internal balance of power within Afghanistan but also the regional balance of power among its competing neighbours was broken. That led to many dissatisfied parties and actors, internal and external, undermining the war.

The bottom line is that the enemy was Al Qaeda and the US should have gone after it single-mindedly. It was a strategic mistake to defeat Al Qaeda by defeating the Taliban. Not that the Taliban should have been tolerated and not touched. No. But that was a separate challenge. It should not have been handled in the context of Al Qaeda and certainly not in preference to defeating Al Qaeda.

The context of dealing with the Taliban was Afghanistan, where the main challenge was reconstruction and stabilisation of the country with a new ethno-regional balance acceptable to all Afghans and all regional players, so they would not feel threatened and would not interfere. In other words, to put together a broken Afghanistan. That was the central challenge. The solution had to be found in this context and in the context of friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan because the Taliban effectively lived in two countries – it was not a question of sanctuaries. That was the reality of post-1979 Afghanistan.

And then you mix up the war with democracy. Democracy in a broken country? It sharpened Afghanistan’s existing fault lines, empowered good and bad alike, and made Karzai politically dependent on the very forces that had brought harm to Afghanistan, who previously had a gun, but now also had a seat in parliament. Washington ended up working with a president who presided over a corrupt and weak government, and came to be seen as Karzai’s backer and ally, and resented as much as he was. No wonder the war soon provoked a resistance that became part insurgency, part jihad, and part civil war, contested by US friends and adversaries alike, like the Taliban, Pakistan, Iran and the Afghan warlords and drug mafia, and the wider population along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Local, regional and global agendas got merged.

Admiral McRaven, who commanded the Abbottabad raid, said in a recent podcast in Foreign Affairs, titled ‘A Warrior’s View of Why War Fails’, that when wars fail, instead of understanding that it may be due to a lack of a political strategy, the planners double down militarily, bringing in more troops and making things worse. And that is what happened in Afghanistan, exacerbating the wider population’s resentment that translated into broader support for the Taliban. The Taliban may have been unacceptable as a government but were tolerated as a resistance force.

Net result: The Taliban had lost political power, but the long war made them stronger as a political force. And a weary America that had lost appetite for failure just walked away, handing back power to the same Taliban from whom it was taken away. What then was the ‘trillion-dollar’ war about?


The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor at Georgetown University.


Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.




Originally published in The News





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